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ABSTRACT
A descending clock auction (DCA) is for buying items from
multiple sellers. The literature has focused on the case where
each bidder has two options: to accept or reject the oﬀered
price. However, in many settings—such as the FCC’s im-
minent incentive auction—each bidder may be able to sell
one from a set of options. We present a multi-option DCA
(MDCA) framework where at each round, the auctioneer
oﬀers each bidder diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent options, and
a bidder may ﬁnd multiple options still acceptable. Setting
prices during a MDCA is trickier than in a DCA. We develop
a Markov chain model for the dynamics of each bidder’s state
(which options are still acceptable). We leverage it to op-
timize the trajectory of price oﬀers to diﬀerent bidders for
diﬀerent options. This is unlike most auctions which only
compute the next price vector. Computing the trajectory
enables better planning. We reoptimize the trajectory af-
ter each round. Each optimization minimizes total payment
while ensuring feasibility in a stochastic sense. We also in-
troduce percentile-based approaches to decrementing prices.
Experiments with real FCC incentive auction interference
constraint data show that the optimization-based approach
dramatically outperforms the percentile-based approach—
because it takes feasibility into account in pricing. Both
pricing techniques scale to the large.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A descending clock auction (DCA) is for buying items
from multiple sellers [2]. The DCA framework is agnostic
to how oﬀered prices are decremented across rounds. Doing
that well is a key problem for which no solutions had been
published until recently. Nguyen and Sandholm recently
presented techniques for this [3]. That paper—and, to our
knowledge, all other papers on incentive auctions and on the
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DCA to date [2, 4]—consider the setting where bidders have
only two options, that is, either to sell or not.
In contrast, in many settings, each seller may be able to
sell one from a set of options. The DCA can be generalized
to this setting by oﬀering each bidder a separate price for
each of her options in each round. However, the problem
of decreasing prices appropriately during the DCA is more
intricate in this multi-option DCA (MDCA) setting.
We present an MDCA framework and price-decrementing
techniques for it. The model captures a broad set of applica-
tions, including the imminent ﬂagship application of DCAs,
the FCC incentive auctions. The FCC announced that a
multi-option DCA will be used for the reverse auction [1],
but left open the important question of how prices will be
decremented across rounds. Ours is, to our knowledge, the
ﬁrst paper on pricing techniques for multi-option DCAs.
We present our MDCA in the domain of the FCC incentive
auction, where the number of options per bidder is at most
three (plus the option of rejecting all three options), but
the techniques can be directly extended to more options.
Bidders (stations) that are currently in the UHF band, have
four choices: go oﬀ-air, go down to LVH, go down to UVH,
or reject all of these options. Similarly, stations currently in
UVH (LVH) have three (two) choices. Rejecting all options
leads to being allocated to a channel in the original band.
In each DCA round, the auctioneer oﬀers each bidder
prices for all the options for which the bidder is still ac-
tive. Each bidder then decides which of those options are
still acceptable. As long as a bidder is still active for an op-
tion, she enters the next round where the same process will
be repeated for the remaining active options. If a bidder
becomes inactive for all options, she needs to be allocated
to her current band and is not paid anything.
2. SETTING & DECREMENTING PRICES
A key component of a DCA is how the prices oﬀered to
active bidders are initialized and decremented across rounds.
The auctioneer needs to consider the tradeoﬀ between min-
imizing payment to the accepted bidders and fulﬁllment of
the target (e.g. repacking feasibility). How the prices are
changed across rounds should depend on (a) the estimated
value functions of the bidders, (b) the importance of the
items for the target to be fulﬁlled and (c) the desired num-
ber of rounds. We provide an optimization model that does
this. To this end, we need to calculate the (expected) num-
ber of stations that will ﬁnally end up in each band—which
is non-trivial. We propose using Markov chains to model
the dynamic of the station’s state throughout the MDCA.
For each station i and for each option k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, sup-
pose the valuations vik are drawn from some distribution
on support [lik, uik]. Assume that the auctioneer knows
these distributions but not the valuations. We denote by
pik, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the oﬀer price to station i for option k and
by qik the probability that station i ﬁnds price pik accept-
able for option k. For example, if the valuation distribution
is uniform, qik =
uik−pik
uik−lik . For convenience, we regard q as
the decision variables that the auctioneer sets.
We deﬁne the state of a station to depend on which of the
three options are still active. Figure 1 shows our Markov
chain for a UHF station’s state throughout the MDCA;
Markov chains for UVH and LVH stations are analogous
but simpler, and are omitted due to limited space.
Figure 1: Markov chain for a UHF station.
Theorem 1. The state transition of the m-round MDCA
with ﬁxed acceptance probabilities (q1, q2, q3) is equivalent to
a single-round MDCA with acceptance probabilities qm1 , q
m
2 , q
m
3 .
The signiﬁcance of Theorem 1 is that, instead of having to
keep track of the transitions throughm rounds, we can apply
the change of variables presented in the theorem, and view
the setting as a single-round MDCA. This helps simplify
the expression of the state probabilities, and helps tame the
complexity of the nonlinear model as we will show.
Optimization approach for price setting: We con-
sider the setting where the auctioneer can oﬀer diﬀerent ac-
ceptance rates to diﬀerent stations. Instead of seeking the
same (q1, q2, q3) for all stations, we aim to ﬁnd the optimal
(qi1, qi2, qi3) for each station i. This gives ﬂexibility and can
lead to lower aggregate payment by the auctioneer.
Our OPT-SCHED model for minimizing expected pay-
ment while ensuring that the expected number of accepted
bidders in each band does not exceed its target is
min
κ
∑
i∈N
fi(κi)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
gi(κi) ≤ CUHF ,
∑
i∈N
hi(κi) ≤ CUVH ,
∑
i∈N
ui(κi) ≤ CLVH ,
where κik = q
m
ik and fi(κi) is the expected payment to
station i and where gi(κi), hi(κi), ui(κi) are the probabil-
ities of station i ending up in UHF, UVH and LVH bands,
respectively. The C’s are the given targets. Here, we utilized
Theorem 1 to transform from decision variable q to κ and
show that the resulting model has a 4th-order polynomial
on the objective function and 3rd-order polynomials on the
constraints.
This problem has 3n continuous variables. Solving it di-
rectly is still not easy due to nonlinearity and nonconvexity.
However, the problem has a separable objective and separa-
ble constraints. Hence we can apply Lagrangian relaxation.
Percentile-based approach for price setting: A sim-
ple way to adjust prices across MDCA rounds is to decrease
each price by a given percentage—starting from the upper
bound of the support of the station’s valuation distribution
for each of the options.
3. EXPERIMENTS
We tested our optimization-based price-decrementing tech-
nique against the percentile-based method using the real
FCC constraint data. Since no incentive auctions have yet
been conducted, we had to generate data on the bounds on
the bidders’ valuations. We did that based on population
size covered by each license. (Results for the symmetric set-
ting were very similar and are omitted due to limited space.)
We tried a number of possible acceptance probabilities in
the range {0.97, 0.975, 0.98, 0.985, 0.99, 0.995, 1} and report
the sum of the prices of all active options of the second-to-
last (i.e., last feasible) round for the asymmetric setting.1
Figure 2 shows that OPT-SCHED yields lower ﬁnal pay-
ment than the percentile-based approach—for all choices of
the ﬁxed per-round acceptance probability in the latter—on
all instances. It results in 25% lower payment on average.
It is able to reject high bids by taking into account fea-
sibility considerations. It typically succeeds in proceeding
through signiﬁcantly more rounds before reaching infeasibil-
ity by more intelligently taking feasibility into account in
the pricing.
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Figure 2: The sum of prices, the bidders’ respective
valuations, and the number of rounds used.
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1After the last round where the packing ceases to be feasi-
ble, the auctioneer has to decide an outcome for each bidder
so as to minimize total payment. We developed a technique
for this using decomposition of the station graph (into geo-
graphical regions) and Lagrangean relaxation.
